員工激勵問題及對策外文翻譯文獻

員工激勵問題及對策外文翻譯文獻員工激勵問題及對策外文翻譯文獻(文檔含中英文對照即英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：Researchdirection:staffmotivationproblemsandCountermeasures1.IntroductionAsrecognizedinthelaw(e.g.,theSarbanes-OxleyActof2002),professionalriskframe-works(CommitteeofSponsoringOrganizationsoftheTreadwayCommission[COSO]1992,2004),auditingstandards(AmericanInstituteofCerti?edPublicAccountants[AICPA]2007;PublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard[PCAOB]2007),accountingtextbooks(Redingetal.2007;RomneyandSteinbart2009),andmanagementbestpractices(MerchantandVanderStede2007),formalcontrolsserveavitalroleinsafeguardingacompany’soperationalprocesses,information,andassetsandinprovidingreasonableassuranceregard-ingthereliabilityof?nancialreporting.Althoughcriticaltoacompany’ssuccess,relativelylittleisunderstoodabouthowandwhyspeci?ctypesofformalcontrolareeffective.Priorresearchinaccountingandeconomicsexamineshowformalcontrolsin?uenceemployeebehavior,often?ndingthatformalcontrolscanhavenegativeconsequences,suchasloweremployeeeffortand?rmpro?t.Recently,researchhasbeguntofocusonhowemployees’responsetoformalcontrolscanbein?uencedbyspeci?caspectsoftheimposedcontrol(e.g.,Christ,Sedatole,andTowry2011).Thisstudyextendsthislineofresearchbyprovidingevidenceastohowandwhytwotypesofformalcontrols,preven-tivecontrolsanddetectivecontrols,affectemployeeperformanceandmotivation.RomneyandSteinbart(2009:200)de?nepreventivecontrolsascontrolsthat‘‘deterproblemsbeforetheyarise’’anddetectivecontrolsascontrolsdesignedto‘‘discoverprob-lemsaftertheyoccur’’.Thesetypesofformalcontrolsdifferintwofundamentalways.First,preventivecontrolsrestrictemployees’autonomybyprohibitingcertainbehaviors(e.g.,employeescannotenterdataormakeapaymentunlessauthorizedtodoso).Alter-natively,detectivecontrolsmaintainthedecisionrightsofemployeesandthereforedonotlimittheirautonomy(Christ,Sedatole,Towry,andThomas2008).Second,thefeedbackprovidedbypreventivecontrolsisneverdelayed,whereasdetectivecontrolscanprovideimmediateordelayedfeedback.Importantly,companiescanoftenchoosetoimposeeitherpreventiveordetectivecontrolstoaddressthesamecontrolobjective.Forexample,withrespecttotheexpenditurecycle,differenttypesofcontrolscanbeimplementedtoensurethatonlyauthorizedcashdisbursementsaremade.Speci?cally,managementcouldimplementeachofthefollowingtypesofcontrols:(1)preventive:estab-lishauthorizationlimitsprohibitingemployeesfrominitiatingdisbursementsaboveapre-speci?edamount;(2)detectivewithimmediatefeedback:analertisactivatedonanemployeeand?orsupervisor’scomputermonitorwhenadisbursementaboveaprespeci?edamounthasbeenentered;or(3)detectivewithdelayedfeedback:areportofalldisburse-mentsovertheprespeci?edamountisproducedperiodically(e.g.,monthly).Ourresearchexaminesdifferentialcostsandbene?tsofthesethreetypesofcontrols,whichshouldenablemanagerstomakemoreinformedcontroldecisions.Weexamineseveralofthecostsandbene?tsofthesetypesofformalcontrolsinaset-tinginwhichmanagementhasimplementedanincompletecontract.Speci?cally,onedimensionoftheemployees’responsibilitiesisdirectlycompensated(i.e.,compensatedtaskdimension)andtheotherdimensionisnotcompensated,butissubjecttoaformalcontrolimposedbymanagement(i.e.,controlledtaskdimension).Weexaminetheeffectsoffor-malcontrolonthecompensatedandcontrolleddimensionsofthetaskseparatelysothatwecanisolateformalcontroleffectsfromtheincentivecontracteffects.Werelyonpsychologyresearchonsalience,norms,andintrinsicmotivationtoformourpredictionsregardinghowpreventiveanddetectivecontrolswillaffectemployeeper-formanceandmotivation.Weexpectthatwhenaformalcontrolisactivated,itwillincreasethesalienceoftheemployee’sgoaltocomplywithvariousgoalsoftheorganiza-tionforwhichs?heisnotexplicitlycompensated,despitethefactthatitmaycon?ictwiththeemployee’sgoaltoperformstronglyonthecompensateddimensionsofhis?hertask.Wehypothesizethatreductionsinautonomycausedbyacontrolandincreasesinthetimelinessofcontrolfeedbackwillincreasethesalienceofthecontrolobjective.Thus,weexpectemployeessubjecttopreventivecontrolstoexhibitstrongerperformanceonthecontrolleddimensionthanemployeesintheothercontrolconditions.Employeesworkinginconditionswithdetectivecontrolswithimmediatefeedbackshouldbethenextbestper-formersonthecontrolleddimensionofthetaskfollowedbyemployeesworkingincondi-tionswithdetectivecontrolswithdelayedfeedbackandemployeesoperatingwithoutcontrols,respectively.Motivationalframingresearchfurthersuggeststhatitisdif?cultforindividualstohavemultiple(potentiallycon?icting)goals?framesactivatedatthesametime(Lindenberg2001).Wethereforepredictthatwhenemployeesfocusonthegoalofperformingwellonthecontrolledtaskdimension,theywillfocuslessonthegoaltoexcelonothertaskdimensions(e.g.,thecompensateddimensioninourstudy)andwillconsequentlyperformworseonthosedimensions.Thissuggestsareverseorderofhowemployeesfacingthesecontroltypeswillperformonthecompensateddimensionofthetaskrelativetotheirper-formanceonthecontrolleddimension.Totestthesepredictions,weuseasimpli?eddataentrytaskinanexperimentalsettinginwhichparticipantsare?nanciallymotivatedtoenterdataasquicklyaspossible(com-pensateddimension).Importantly,participantsareinformedthatthecompanyvaluesbothdataentryspeedandaccuracy.However,ratherthanalsocompensatingparticipantsforaccuracy,thecompanyimplementsaformalcontroltoencourageaccuracy(controlleddimension).Ourresultsrevealthatparticipantsexposedtopreventivecontrolsordetectivecontrolswithimmediatefeedbackperformsigni?cantlybetteronthecontrolleddimensionofthetask(dataentryaccuracy)thanparticipantsinthedetectivecontrol-delayedfeedbackcon-dition.Thissuggeststhatthetimelinessofcontrolfeedbackisthesalientfeaturein?uenc-ingperformance.Wedonot?nddifferencesintheoverallperformanceonthecompensateddimension(dataentryspeed),suggestingthatexplicitincentivesstillprovideapowerfulmotivationdespitetheactivationofformalcontrolsdirectingattentiontootherdimensionsofthetask.Inadditiontoexamininghowformalcontrolsaffectemployeeperformance,weaddtothegrowingliteratureontheunintendedcostsofformalcontrolsbyexamininghowdifferentformalcontroltypesaffectemployees’intrinsicmotivationtoperformthetask.Weexpectthatbecausepreventivecontrolsrestrictautonomy,whichlikelywillbeperceivedbyemployeesas‘‘controlling’’,theywillbemoredetrimentaltoemployees’intrinsicmotivationthandetectivecontrols.Consistentwithourexpectations,theresultsshowthatpreventivecontrolssigni?cantlyreduceintrinsicmotivationrelativetobothtypesofdetectivecontrols.Thissuggeststhattheextenttowhichformalcontrolsrestrictemployees’autonomy,andnotthetimelinessofthefeedbacktheyprovide,in?uencesemployees’intrinsicmotivationtoperformtheirresponsibilities.Further,wecon?rmresultsfrompriorresearchfindingthatlowerintrinsicmotivationleadstolowerperformanceonalldimensionsofthetask.Takentogether,ourresultssuggestthatdetectivecontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedbackcanbejustaseffectiveatproducinghighemployeeperformanceaspreventivecontrols(andmoreeffectivethandetectivecontrolswithdelayedfeedbackornocontrols),withoutcausingadecreaseinintrinsicmotivationthatisexhibitedbyemployeessubjectedtopreventivecontrols.Therefore,organizationscanlikelyachievemanyoftheircontrolobjectivesbyincreasingthetimelinessoffeedbackfromdetectivecontrols,withoutbearingthecostsassociatedwithpreventivecontrols.Thisstudyprovidesseveralimportantpracticalandtheoreticalcontributions.First,thisstudycaninformpractitioners,auditors,andregulatorswhodesign,implement,andevaluateformalcontrolsaboutsomeofthepotentialcostsandbene?tsofvarioustypesofformalcontrols.Formalcontrolsplayacriticalroleinpromotingef?ciency,reducingriskofassetloss,ensuringthereliabilityof?nancialstatements,andpromotingcompliancewithlawsandregulations(COSO1992).Ourstudysuggeststhatpractitionerscanbetterachievemanyofthesecontrolobjectivesbyimplementingformalcontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedback.Furthermore,thisstudysuggeststhatformalcontrolswhichrestrictemployeeautonomyreduceemployees’intrinsicmotivation,andpractitionerswouldthere-forebenefitinmanysituationsbyimplementingformalcontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedbackbutdonotrestrictuserautonomy.Second,thisstudycontributestoseveralstreamsofacademicresearchonformalcon-trols.Toourknowledge,oursisthe?rststudytoexaminethedifferentialimpactofpre-ventiveanddetectivecontrolsonemployeeperformanceandmotivation.Further,thisstudyalsocontributestoagrowingbodyofliteratureexaminingsomeoftheunintendedconsequencesofformalcontrols(e.g.,Frey1993;DasandTeng1999;TenbrunselandMessick1999;Christetal.2008;TaylerandBloom?eld2011).Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2providestheoreticaldevelopmentofourhypotheses.Insection3wedescribeourexperiment.Weprovideourresultsinsection4andconcludeanddescribepotentialavenuesforfutureresearchinsection5.2.LiteraturereviewandhypothesesdevelopmentClassi?cationsandimportanceofformalcontrolsFormalcontrolscantakemanyforms,including,butnotlimitedto,policiesandproce-dures,segregationofduties,performance-basedcompensation,supervisoryreviews,com-puterizededitchecks,andsoon.Academicshavedevelopedavarietyofcontrolframeworkstoclassifythemanydifferenttypesofcontrols.Somefocusontheobjectofcontrol(e.g.,behaviorvs.output)(MerchantandVanderStede2007),whileothersfocusonthecontrolmethod(e.g.,boundarysystems,beliefsystems,etc.)(Simons1990).How-ever,practicingaccountantsandauditorsgenerallyclassifycontrolsaspreventiveordetec-tive,basedonhowriskismitigated(COSO1992,2004;AICPA2007;PCAOB2007).Whendeterminingthespeci?cformalcontroltypetoimplement,managementwouldbene?tfromunderstandinghowdifferentcontroltypesin?uenceemployeeperformanceandmotivation.Further,prioracademicresearchrevealsthatformalcontrolsoftenhaveunintendedconsequences,whichcanultimatelybedetrimentaltotheorganization(e.g.,DasandTeng2001).Therefore,managementshouldalsoconsiderthepotentialrepercus-sionsoftheircontroldesignchoiceswhendesigningformalcontrols.Inthisstudy,weexamineasimpli?edworkenvironmentinwhichwemanipulatetheformalcontroltypeandmeasureemployeeperformanceandintrinsicmotivation.Similartotherealworld,weuseaworkenvironmentinwhichmanagementemploysanincompletecontract(e.g.,Williamson1985;Ittner,Larcker,andRajan1997),usingformalcompensationcontractstoencouragecertaintypesofbehaviorwhileimplementingformacontrolstoencourageothertypesofbehavior.Thus,weexaminehowdifferentformacontroltypesimpactemployees’performanceonbothcompensatedandcontrolleddimensionsoftheirresponsibilities.Thecontrolenvironmentusedinourexperimentisdesignedtoisolatetheeffectofvariousformalcontroltypesfromtheeffectsoftheincentivecontract.Therefore,weexplicitlydonotcompensatetheemployeesbasedonalltaskdimensions,butratherallowtheformalcontroltoinducecertaindesiredbehavior.EffectofformalcontrolsoncontrolledtaskdimensionsStandardeconomictheorypredictsthatindividualsareself-interestedandthereforepri-marilymotivatedbyexplicitincentives.Followingthislogic,employeesareexpectedtorespondonlytothe?nancialincentivesdescribedintheirformalemploymentcontract.However,agrowingbodyofresearchonindividuals’preferencesforsocialnormsandsit-uationalframingsuggeststhatthereareotherwaystodirectemployees’behaviortowardsthebestinterestsoftheorganization(e.g.,Evans,Hannan,Krishnan,andMoser2001;CamererandFehr2004;OsterlohandFrey2004;Hannan2005;Hannan,Rankin,andTowry2006;FischerandHuddart2008).Asubstantialbodyofresearchhasdevelopedindicatingthatindividualsarestronglymotivatedbystatedgoalsandobjectives(e.g.,Locke,Shaw,Saari,andLatham1981;LockeandLatham1990;Locke1996).Indeed,speci?cperformancemeasuresareincorpo-ratedintoemploymentcontractstoalignemployees’goalswiththegoalsoftheorganiza-tionsothatemployeeswillfocustheireffortsonactivitiesbene?tingtheorganization(Farrell,Kadous,andTowry2008).Onereasongoalsprovidesuchpowerfulmotivationisthattheycanchangethewayasituationisframed.Lindenberg(2003)describestwoframeslinkedtoemployees’goalsthat,together,canprovidestronggovernance:thegainframeandthenormativeframe.Thegainframerelatestoone’sgoaltoimproveone’sresources(i.e.,earnmoney).Thenormativeframeisrelatedtoone’sgoalto‘‘actappropriately’’,whichcanbedefinedasadheringtoinstitutionalizedrulessuchaspoliciesandpro-cedures(MarchandOlsen1995).Whenanemployeeisfacedwithanexplicitcontracttyingspeci?caspectsofhis?herperformanceto?nancialincentives,itislikelythatthegainframewillbedominantandanyothergoalswillbesecondary(Lindenberg2003).However,individuals’behaviorcanberedirectedorrefocusedwhenastimulusisintro-duced.Inthispaper,wearguethattheactivationofaformalcontrolissuchastimulus.翻譯：研究方向：員工激勵問題及對策1.引言公認的法律(如。,2002年的薩班斯-奧克斯利法案),職業風險框架(行動委員會贊助組織委員會(COSO)1992年,2004年),審計準則(美國注冊會計師協會(會計師協會)2007;公眾公司會計監督委員會(PCAOB)2007),會計教科書(雷丁etal.2007;羅姆尼和Steinbart2009),和管理最佳實(MerchantandVanderStede2007),正式的控制有重要作用在維護公司的操作流程,信息,資產和提供合理的保證regard-ing財務報告的可靠性。雖然對公司的成功至關重要,相對較少的理解如何以及為什么特定類型的正式控制是有效的。先前的研究在會計和經濟學研究正式控制如何影響員工的行為,經常發現正式的控制可以有負面影響,如降低員工的努力和公司的利潤。最近的研究已經開始關注如何影響員工應對正式控制的特定方面實施控制(如。2011年,SedatoleTowry)。本研究擴展了這一行的研究提供的證據是如何以及為什么兩種類型的正式控制,遠程控制和偵探控制,影響員工績效和動力。羅姆尼和Steinbart(2009:2009)預防控制定義為控制,阻止之前就出現問題,偵探控制作為控制設計為“發現難題后發生”。這些類型的正式控制不同在兩個基本方面。首先,預防控制限制禁止某些行為(如員工的自主權。,員工不能輸入數據或付款除非授權這樣做)。也可,偵探控制維護員工的決策權,因此不限制他們的自主權(基督,Sedatole、Towry和托斯·2008)。第二,預防控制提供的反饋是從來沒有推遲,而偵探控制可以提供立即或延遲反饋。重要的是,企業通常可以選擇實施預防性或偵探控制地址相同的控制目標。例如,對于支出周期,不同類型的控制可以確保只有經過授權的實現現金支付。具體來說,管理可以實現以下類型的控制:(1)預防:建立授權限制禁止員工發起支付高于預先規定的數量;(2)與即時反饋偵探:警報被激活員工和?或上司的電腦顯示器時支付指定金額已經進入以上;或(3)偵探延遲反饋:所有支付超過指定數量的報告是定期(如。、每月)。我們研究了微分的成本與效益這三種類型的控制,這應該使管理者做出更明智的控制決策。我們檢查一些成本和收益的這些類型的正式控制set-ting管理實現了一個不完整的合同。具體地說,一維的直接補償(即員工的責任。,補償任務維度)和其他維度不是補償,但正式的控制(即實施管理。控制任務維度)。我們檢查的影響對于控制任務的補償和控制維度分別,這樣我們可以隔離正式控制效果的激勵契約的影響。我們依靠卓越心理學研究,規范和內在動機形成我們的預測預防和偵探控制如何影響員工由于和動力。我們希望當一個正式的控制被激活時,它能夠提升員工的卓越的目標符合各種目標集聚的年代?他是沒有明確補償,盡管它可能與員工的目標沖突表現強勁的補償尺度?她的任務。我們假設減少引起的自主控制,提高控制反饋的及時性將增加顯著的控制目標。因此,我們期望員工須預防控制在控制維度表現出更強的性能比其他員工的控制條件。員工工作條件與偵探控制即時反饋應該是下一個最好的先前成型機任務的控制維度緊隨其后的是員工為對象與偵探與延遲反饋控制和員工操作沒有控制,分別。激勵框架研究進一步表明,個人很難有多個(可能是相互沖突的)目標?幀同時激活(Lindenberg2001)。因此,我們預測,當員工關注的目標表現良好控制任務維度,他們會更少關注目標在其他任務維度(如excel。,在我們的研究)和補償維度將因此對這些維度執行更糟。這說明員工們如何面對這些控制類型的倒序將執行任務的補償尺寸相對于由于控制尺寸。測試這些預測,我們使用一個簡化的數據錄入任務參與者在實驗環境下的經濟動機盡快輸入數據(補償維度)。重要的是,參與者被告知公司價值觀數據輸入的速度和準確性。然而,而不是也為精度補償參與者,該公司實現了一個正式的控制,鼓勵精度(尺寸控制)。我們的研究結果顯示,參與者暴露預防控制與即時反饋表現得明顯更好或偵探控制任務的控制維度(數據錄入準確性)的參與者偵探控制反饋。這表明影響控制反饋的及時性是顯著特征的性能。我們沒有找到補償的總體性能的差異維度(數據錄入速度),建議明確激勵仍然提供了一個強大的動機盡管正式激活控制指揮注意任務的其他維度。除了檢查正式控制如何影響員工的表現,我們增加了文學在正式的意想不到的成本控制通過檢查不同的正式控制類型如何影響員工的內在動機來執行任務。我們預計,由于預防控制限制的自主權,這可能將員工視為“控制”,他們將更不利于員工的內在動機比偵探控制。與我們的預期一致,結果表明,預防控制顯著降低內在動機相對于兩種類型的偵探控制。這表明正式的控制在多大程度上限制員工的自主權,而不是他們